Abstract-We investigate the resiliency of wireless sensor networks against sensor capture attacks when the network uses the random pairwise key distribution scheme of Chan et al. We present conditions on the model parameters so that the network is: 1) unassailable and 2) unsplittable, both with high probability, as the number n of sensor nodes becomes large. Both notions are defined against an adversary who has unlimited computing resources and full knowledge of the network topology, but can only capture a negligible fraction o(n) of sensors. We also show that the number of cryptographic keys needed to ensure unassailability and unsplittability under the pairwise key predistribution scheme is an order of magnitude smaller than it is under the key predistribution scheme of Eschenauer and Gligor.
limitations imposed on the physical memory and power consumption of the individual sensors. Traditional key exchange and distribution protocols are based on trusting third parties, and this makes them inadequate for large-scale WSNs whose topologies are unknown prior to deployment. See the references [2] , [14] , [17] [18] [19] for discussions of the security challenges in WSN settings.
Random key predistribution schemes address some of these difficulties by randomly assigning secure keys to sensor nodes prior to network deployment. This idea was first introduced by Eschenauer and Gligor [7] whose scheme, hereafter referred to as the EG scheme, operates as follows: Each of the n sensor nodes is equipped with Σ EG cryptographic keys that are selected independently and uniformly at random from a pool of P keys. Two sensors can then secure a communication link if they have at least one key in common.
Over the past decade, many competing alternatives to the EG scheme have been proposed; see the papers [2] , [17] [18] [19] for detailed surveys of various key predistribution schemes for WSNs. In this paper we consider the random pairwise key predistribution scheme of Chan et al. [3] : Before deployment, each of the n sensor nodes is paired (offline) with K distinct nodes which are randomly selected from amongst all other nodes. For each sensor and any sensor paired to it, a unique (pairwise) key is generated and stored in both their memory modules along with their ids. An existing wireless communication link between two nodes can be made secure if one of the nodes is paired to the other (so that they have at least one pairwise key in common). Precise implementation details are given in Section II-A. Interest in this scheme stems from its various operational advantages over the EG scheme, e.g., nodeto-node authentication and quorum-based revocation without involving a base station; see [3] for more details.
B. Contributions
Given these important advantages, we have found it of interest to assess the performance of the pairwise scheme. A number of issues related to its secure connectivity and to the dimensioning of memory sizes have already been discussed in the recent papers [22] , [26] , [28] [29] [30] . In the present paper, we explore instead the resiliency of the pairwise scheme against node capture attacks. The setup is one where an extremely powerful and knowledgeable adversary captures a subset of the sensor nodes with the goal of severely impairing the functionality of the entire network. As was done for the EG scheme in [12] , the main question is whether this objective can be achieved by capturing a (relatively) small number of sensors.
This issue is analyzed in the many node regime under the assumption of full visibility, namely when all nodes are within transmission range of each other. We first look at the asymptotic behavior of the maximum number C r (n; K) of edges that can be compromised by capturing r nodes vs. the total number |E(n; K)| of secure edges in the network as the number n of sensors grows unboundedly large -Here K is the parameter specifying the pairwise scheme; see Section II-A for details. Next, we characterize the asymptotic behavior of the size I r (n; K) of the largest subset of sensors whose communications with the rest of the network can be compromised by capturing r nodes. We give conditions on how to scale K with n (i.e., K = K n ) so that if r n = o(n), then with high probability the quantity C rn (n; K n ) (resp. I rn (n; K n )) grows sub-linearly with |E(n; K n )| (resp. n). These conditions are highly desirable as they imply that an adversary cannot impair a considerable part of the network without capturing a considerable number of nodes. These two notions were introduced by Mei et al. in [12] under the names of unassailability and unsplittability, respectively, in the context of the EG scheme. A comparison with the results of Mei et al. [12] shows that under the pairwise scheme both properties can be realized with memory requirements which are order of magnitude smaller than the ones needed by the EG scheme.
C. Notation and Conventions
All statements involving limits are understood with n going to infinity. The random variables (rvs) under consideration are all defined on the same probability triple (Ω, F , P). Probabilistic statements are made with respect to this probability measure P, and we denote the corresponding expectation operator by E. The indicator function of an event E is denoted by 1 [E] . Distributional equality is denoted by = st , and we use P −→ n to denote convergence in probability as n gets large. The abbreviation a.a.s. reads asymptotically almost surely, and is understood with n getting large. We shall use Bin(n, p) to denote a Binomial rv with n trials and success probability p.
When comparing the asymptotic behavior of two sequences a, b : N 0 → R + , we use the standard Landau notation: Thus, a n = o(b n ) is a shorthand for lim n→∞ an bn = 0, whereas a n = O(b n ) means that there exists C > 0 such that a n ≤ Cb n for all n sufficiently large. Also, we write a n = Ω(b n ) if b n = O(a n ), or equivalently, if there exists c > 0 such that a n ≥ cb n for all n sufficiently large.
D. Organization of the Paper
The paper is organized as follows: In Section II, we describe the random pairwise key predistribution scheme of Chan et al. (hereafter simply referred to as the pairwise scheme) and the random K-out graph it naturally induces (under full visibility) -Earlier work on its connectivity properties is also recalled. The notions of unassailability and unsplittability are formally introduced in Section III as a precise way to capture network resiliency against node capture attacks; in each case, formal definitions are given, followed by the corresponding results. In Section IV we develop heuristic arguments which shed some light on the results. The impact of the full visibility assumption is briefly discussed in Section V. Some numerical results are presented in Section VI. In Section VII we identify the required key ring sizes needed to achieve unassailability and unsplittability under the pairwise scheme. A comparison with the EG scheme is given in Section VIII. The proofs of the main results are given in Section XI and Section XII -Key to the analysis are Hoeffding-type bounds which are developed in Section IX and Section X. Section XIII contains the proof of a key result concerning maximal key ring sizes. Conclusions are given in Section XIV where some directions for future research are also outlined.
II. THE MODEL
The pairwise scheme and its induced random graph are parametrized by two positive integers n and K such that K < n. They are held fixed throughout this section.
A. The Random Pairwise Key Predistribution Scheme
The network comprises n nodes, labeled i = 1, . . . , n, with unique ids Id 1 , . . . , Id n . Write N n = {1, . . . , n} and set N n,−i = N n − {i} for each i = 1, . . . , n. With node i, we associate a subset Γ n,i (K) of K nodes selected uniformly at random from N n,−i -Each of the nodes in Γ n,i (K) is said to be paired to node i. Thus, for any subset A ⊆ N n,−i , we require
Put differently, the selection of Γ n,i (K) is done uniformly amongst all subsets of N n,−i which are of size K. The rvs Γ n,1 (K), . . . , Γ n,n (K) are assumed to be mutually independent.
Once this offline random pairing has been created, we construct the key rings Σ n,1 (K), . . . , Σ n,n (K), one for each node, as follows: We assume the availability of nK distinct cryptographic keys {ω i| , i = 1, . . . , n; = 1, . . . , K}. Fix i = 1, . . . , n and let n,i : Γ n,i (K) → {1, . . . , K} denote a labeling of Γ n,i (K). For each node j in Γ n,i (K) paired to i, the cryptographic key ω i| n,i(j) is associated with j. For instance, if the random set Γ n,i (K) is realized as {j 1 , . . . , j K } with 1 ≤ j 1 < . . . < j K ≤ n, then an obvious labeling consists in n,i (j k ) = k for each k = 1, . . . , K so that key ω i|k is associated with node j k . Of course other labelings are possible. Finally, with node j paired to node i, the pairwise key ω n,ij = [Id i |Id j |ω i| n,i (j) ] is constructed and inserted in the memory modules of both nodes i and j. The key ω n,ij is assigned exclusively to the pair of nodes i and j, hence the terminology pairwise predistribution scheme. The key ring Σ n,i (K) of node i is the set of keys given by
If two nodes, say i and j, are within wireless communication range of each other, they will be able to establish a secure link if and only if Σ n,i (K)∩Σ n,j (K) = ∅. This requirement holds if at least one of the events i ∈ Γ n,j (K) or j ∈ Γ n,i (K) takes place, whence
When both events take place simultaneously, the memory modules of nodes i and j both contain the distinct keys ω n,ij and ω n,ji . By construction this scheme supports distributed node-to-node authentication.
B. Random K-Out Graphs
Under full visibility, the pairwise scheme gives rise naturally to the following class of undirected random graphs: The nodes i and j are said to be adjacent, written i ∼ j, if and only if they have at least one key in common in their key rings, namely,
Note that i ∼ i cannot occur since by construction i is never contained in Γ n,i (K). We denote by H(n; K) the undirected random graph on the vertex set {1, . . . , n} induced by the adjacency notion (3). Obviously there are no self-loops.
Throughout let E(n; K) denote the (random) set of undirected edges in H(n; K). In the literature on random graphs the random graph H(n; K) is known as the random K-out graph [1] , [10] , or as the random K-orientable graph [8] . These references adopt the following definition, which can easily be seen to be equivalent to the symmetric adjacency condition (3): For each of the n vertices assign exactly K arcs to K distinct vertices that are selected uniformly at random, and then ignore the orientation of the arcs. The directed version of this graph (i.e., with the orientation of arcs preserved) has also been studied; e.g., see [15] .
C. Connectivity
For future reference we conclude this section with results concerning the connectivity of the class of undirected random graphs introduced in the previous section; recall that a graph is said to be connected when there is a path between every pair of vertices. Here and elsewhere, it will be convenient to refer to any mapping K : N 0 → N 0 as a scaling (for the pairwise scheme) provided the conditions K n < n, n = 2, 3, . . .
hold.
Theorem 1: For any scaling K : N 0 → N 0 such that K n ≥ 2 for all n sufficiently large, it holds that In fact, we have
The zero-one law (4) was established independently by Fenner and Frieze [8] , and by the authors [26] , [29] . In the latter references, the one-law was a by-product of the bound
With n = 50 and K = 2 as in Figure 1 , this last bound already yields a probability of at least 0.999 that the graph is connected.
III. RESILIENCY IN WSNs -THE MAIN RESULTS
As we seek to understand the resiliency of a network against external attacks, we begin by specifying the capabilities of the adversary considered here. To do so we adopt the following model already used in [12] (under full visibility): The adversary (sometimes also called the attacker), upon launching an attack against the network, captures some of its nodes. As a result it now owns the key rings stored at the captured nodes. An edge between two nodes is deemed compromised if the adversary is in possession of a key which is stored in both their key rings -A compromised edge is therefore one that belongs to E(n; K). By construction, under the pairwise scheme an edge becomes compromised as soon as any of its end nodes is captured. The adversary is assumed to have unlimited computing power; it is also expected to have sufficient knowledge of the network that it is able to minimize the number of nodes which need to be captured in order to compromise a given number of edges.
In many WSN applications, the network as a whole can still be considered functional even though a small number of sensors have fallen under the control of the adversary [12] . Hence, in evaluating the level of security provided by a key predistribution scheme, it is natural to ask whether significant damage to network functionalities can be inflicted by capturing only a relatively small number of nodes. The next two sections provide ways to formally address this issue.
A. Unassailability
With A being the set of sensor nodes captured by the adversary, let C A (n; K) denote the total number of (undirected) edges that are compromised as a result of this attack. From earlier remarks it follows that C A (n; K) is the number of edges in E(n; K) with the property that at least one end of the edge is a node in A, i.e.,
The adversary considered here is capable of maximizing C A (n; K) for a given number |A| of nodes to be captured. This leads us to introduce for each r = 1, . . . , n − 1, the maximum number C r (n; K) of edges that can be compromised by capturing r nodes, namely
where P n|r denotes the collections of all subsets of {1, . . . , n} with exactly r elements.
Under the assumptions made on its capabilities, the powerful and knowledgeable attacker considered here will be able to compromise C r (n; K) edges by capturing the appropriate set of r nodes -This reflects a worst case mindset from the perspective of the network. Given this definition, it is natural to ask how does the quantity C r (n; K) behave in relation to the total number |E(n; K)| of edges as n gets large (with K and r possibly scaled with n as K n and r n ). It is common practice [5] , [12] to regard the condition (6) as indicative of the resiliency of the network against node capture attacks. A crucial implication of (6) is that in the many node regime, an adversary will not be able to compromise Ω(|E(n; K n )|) edges by taking over only o(n) nodes. Condition (6) is used as a basis for characterizing the unassailability of the pairwise scheme, and is formally understood as the requirement
Conditions are now given for (7) to occur. Theorem 2: For any scaling K : N 0 → N 0 we have
(n). The speed of convergence to zero at (8) is captured by the upper bound (57) and occurs faster than exponentially fast in n.
Thus, under the pairwise key predistribution scheme a sensor network is always unassailable, irrespective of how the parameter K scales with n. In particular, it is unassailable for fixed values of K. A proof of Theorem 2 is given in Section XI.
B. Unsplittability
Condition (8) checks whether an adversary can compromise a considerable fraction of edges by launching an attack on relatively few sensors. However this condition does not reveal anything about the ability of the adversary to disconnect or split the network. To explore this issue further, we say that the subset S of nodes is A-splittable if by capturing the nodes in A the adversary can compromise all the edges from S to its complement S c = N n −S. To be more precise, let E(n; K)(S) denote the set of (undirected) edges in H(n; K) with one end in S and the other in S c . As per comments made earlier, upon capturing the nodes in A, an edge in E(n; K)(S) is compromised whenever either one of its end nodes belongs to A. The A-splittability of S is therefore characterized by the condition
It is plain that S is A-splittable if and only if its complement S c (in N n ) is A-splittable. Next, for each r = 1, . . . , n − 1, we say that the set S of nodes is r-splittable whenever there exists a set A of r nodes such that S is A-splittable. The r-splittability of S corresponds to the conditions
Given the infinite computing power available to it, the attacker can in principle minimize the number of nodes it needs to capture in order to split S from the rest of the network. Conversely, this attacker will be able to select a set of r nodes so as to inflict maximal damage. Thus, let I r (n; K) denote the size of the largest subset S (with size |S| ≤ n 2 ) that can be disconnected from the rest of the network by capturing r nodes, namely
It is natural to wonder about the behavior of I r (n; K) as n grows large -It is always the case that r ≤ I r (n;
From the perspective of the network, it is desirable that the largest subset which can be disconnected be small whenever the number of captured nodes is small. As in [12] , again scaling K and r with n, this leads to the condition
as our second characterization of resiliency. This can be formally recast as
The main result along these lines is presented next.
whenever r n = o(n) and the scaling satisfies
The speed of convergence to zero at (13) 
is captured by the upper bound (71), and occurs faster than exponentially fast in n.
A proof of Theorem 3 can be found in Section XII. The operational usefulness of (13) derives from the fact that for any subset S of N n , with |S| = Ω(n), an adversary must capture at least Ω(n) nodes in order to compromise all edges from S to S c . Unlike unassailability, the unsplittability of the pairwise scheme does not hold irrespective of the scaling of the parameter K; it indeed requires (14) to be satisfied. The implications of the condition (14) on the number of keys that need to be assigned to each sensor node are discussed in Section VII.
IV. A HEURISTIC ARGUMENT
In this section we present some simple consequences of the model. We then use them to gain some insights into the results, especially Theorem 2, through a heuristic argument.
Consider positive integers n and K such that K < n. For future reference we write
A. Link Probabilities
Recall that for any pair of nodes i, j = 1, . . . , n,
By construction it holds that
Next, consider the case of distinct i, j = 1, . . . , n: Elementary set-theoretic arguments readily give
with
The rvs Γ n,1 (K), . . . , Γ n,n (K) being i.i.d., it follows from (15) that
Collecting these facts we conclude that the link probabilities are given by
B
. An Easy Calculation
Pick a subset A ⊆ N n of nodes and recall the definition of C A (n; K) given in (5). Its exact expression (18) is easily derived. It is also a simple matter to check that
Note that (18) reduces to (19) when A = N n (as expected). Taking expectations in (18) and using (17) we find
In a similar way, starting with (19), we have
as expected. Combining these expressions leads to
C. A Heuristic Based on Concentration
We now turn to the situation of Theorem 2: Consider a scaling K : N 0 → N 0 . For each n = 1, 2, . . ., pick a subset A n ⊆ N n , and write r n = |A n |. From (22) we find
an expression where, somewhat surprisingly, K n does not appear. It is now plain that
regardless of the behavior of the scaling K : N 0 → N 0 . Under the enforced i.i.d. assumptions, it is not unreasonable to expect from the expressions (18) and (19) that concentration results will hold for these quantities: In particular, the rvs C An (n; K n ) and |E(n; K n )| would then be concentrated around their expected values E [C rn (n; K n )] and E [|E(n; K n )|], respectively, with high probability. By a continuity argument this would lead one to suspect that the ratio
is concentrated around the ratio of the expected values with high probability in the n large limit. In view of earlier remarks it is now only a small step to expect that when r n = o(n),
In establishing Theorem 2 we do in fact show a stronger result, namely
V. ON THE IMPACT OF THE FULL VISIBILITY ASSUMPTION
The work reported here concerns the unassailability and unsplittability of sensor networks under the full visibility assumption. Although this assumption is unlikely to hold in realistic settings, it allows one to isolate the impact of the pairwise key predistribution protocol on the resulting network resiliency; it also makes it possible to give a detailed mathematical analysis of the issues of interest. However, situations where the full visibility assumption does not hold, are of great practical importance and deserve further study.
On the basis of the heuristics given in Section IV we now argue how these more complex situations can be handled as well. Indeed, these heuristic arguments suggest that under full visibility, the unassailability of a network is strongly signaled by the ratio
approaching zero as n gets large when the set A of compromised nodes scales as |A|/n = r n /n = o (1) . When the full visibility assumption is dropped, both the nominator and denominator in (24) will decrease. For a concrete example, consider the on-off communication channel model [21] , [24] , [25] , [30] : The channels between pairs of sensors are mutually independent, and each channel is on (resp. off) with probability p (resp. 1 − p). It is also reasonable to assume that the communications processes are independent of the random key distribution scheme. Under this setting, let C A (n; K, p) and |E(n; K, p)| denote the analog of the quantities C A (n; K) and |E(n; K)|, respectively, under the on-off channel model.
Under the assumed independence, it holds that
and
conditionally on the randomness induced by the random pairwise scheme. Therefore,
Thus, the ratio does not change as we move from full visibility to partial visibility under the on-off channel model, and concentration arguments could again be brought to bear. We might therefore expect that the paper's conclusions are still valid under this communication model, namely, the pairwise scheme achieves unassailability for any choice of K. In fact, by independence and linearity of expectation, most of the arguments given above would also hold for more complicated wireless channel models.
On the other hand, analyzing network unsplittability will be more challenging under partial visibility. The results are likely to differ significantly from those found in the full visibility case, and to be much more sensitive to the underlying communication model being used. To see why this may be so, consider the disk model [13] where sensors can communicate only if their distance is less than some transmission radius ρ > 0. For simplicity, assume the n sensors to be independently and randomly deployed on the unit square [0, 1] 2 , and take ρ < 0.5:
Imagine that the adversary captures all the nodes located in the rectangular strip
The set of compromised nodes, still denoted A as before, is now a random subset of the set of all nodes. Let
2 on each side of Γ(ρ). Obviously, nodes in Γ − (ρ) and Γ + (ρ), respectively, cannot communicate since they are at least at distance 2ρ of each other -No wireless communication is therefore possible between these two components. Note that the expected number of nodes in Γ ± (ρ) is given by n(0.5 − ρ), and can then be construed as large if ρ = o(1). Yet it seems reasonable to argue that this network will indeed be "splittable" regardless of how large the parameter K is selected! The number |A| of sensors involved in this attack is admittedly random; it is distributed like Bin(n; 2ρ) with E [|A|] = 2nρ, and for ρ = o(1), the condition r n = o(n) will hold in expectation. However, in this case "splittability" was achieved by preventing two large pieces of the network to communicate with each other regardless of whether a pair of nodes, one in each piece, had the requisite keys to secure their communication link, had it be available. This points to the need to refine the notion of unsplittability in such settings, possibly by requiring that the (unsecured) communication network form a connected graph. A more detailed discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of this paper, and will be taken on elsewhere.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
It would be desirable to validate the results discussed here by means of numerical simulations, in the process gaining better insights into the notions of unassailability and unsplittability under the pairwise scheme. Unfortunately the attack model assumed in this paper is not computationally bounded: Fig. 2 . With n = 1, 000 and K = 2, we plot the logarithm of the upper bound given in (57) for the probability of an adversary compromising more than ε fraction of the links by capturing a fraction r/n of the nodes. Fig. 3 . With n = 1, 000 and K = 4, we plot the logarithm of the upper bound given in (57) for the probability of an adversary compromising more than ε fraction of the links by capturing a fraction r/n of the nodes.
The adversary can maximize the number of compromised links or the size of the subgraph that it can split. But implementing such optimal strategies requires exponentially large amount of computing time and resources. Consequently, evaluating C r (n; K) and I r (n; K) (and their statistics) is not feasible unless the network comprises very few sensors.
Instead, we rely on the intermediary probability bound (57) (appearing in the proof of Theorem 2 in Section XI) for fixed values of n, K and r, as a way to better understand how the fraction C r (n;K) |E(n;K)| of compromised links in the network is related to the fraction r n of captured nodes. With the help of this bound we can answer questions such as "What are the odds that the adversary can compromise at least 15% of the links by capturing just 1% of the sensors?".
Next we provide some numerical results to illustrate how the bound (57) behaves for various parameter values. We consider two scenarios, Scenario 1 and Scenario 2, each with the same number of nodes, namely n = 1000. We set K = 2 for Scenario 1 and K = 4 for Scenario 2. In each case we plot the upper bound on the logarithm of the probability that an adversary is able to compromise at least a fraction ε = 0.1, 0.2, 0.3 of the links, as a function of the fraction of captured nodes r/n. Figure 2 and Figure 3 correspond to Scenario 1 and Scenario 2, respectively, and give some indication as to how the resiliency of the pairwise scheme varies with the parameter K. For instance, even with K = 4, an adversary that captures 40 sensors in a network of size 1000 has a negligible chance (e.g., less than 0.05%) of compromising a significant fraction (e.g., 30%) of the network communications.
VII. RESILIENCY VS. THE SIZE OF KEY RINGS
Theorem 2 and Theorem 3 give conditions on K for the network to be unassailable and unsplittable, respectively, with high probability; this provides guidelines for dimensioning the pairwise scheme to ensure resiliency against node-capture attacks in the many node regime. However, these results do not map in a straightforward manner into the required number of cryptographic keys needed in each sensor node. Such information is certainly desirable to help assess how network resiliency under the pairwise scheme is affected by its memory requirements.
A. The Key Rings Are of Random and Variable Size
The difficulty in assessing the number of keys required per sensor can be traced to the fact that the key rings Σ n,1 (K), . . . , Σ n,n (K) are not of constant size -This is in sharp contrast with the EG scheme and its variants (as briefly discussed in Section VIII). Indeed, here the key rings are of random size varying from node to node over the range
This is a direct consequence of (2) as we note that
It follows that
because (16) 
B. On the Average and Expected Size of Key Rings
As suggested above, it is of interest to explore the behavior of |Σ n,1 (K)|, . . . , |Σ n,n (K)| in order to better understand the size of the key rings induced by the conditions of Theorem 2 and Theorem 3. Beyond operational concerns, this would also allow us to meaningfully compare our findings with those obtained for the EG scheme [12] .
To this end, we first observe from the distributional equality (27) that
Thus, a simple relation exists between the scheme parameter K and the expected number of cryptographic keys stored in a given sensor. Averaging over the nodes of the network, we also see that the average number of cryptographic keys per node is given by
Indeed, by construction the pairwise scheme provides each of the n sensors with K distinct keys, and a copy of each such key is given to another sensor selected uniformly at random. As a result, there is a total of 2Kn keys distributed amongst the n sensors (of which nK are distinct). The relation (29) can also be seen from (26) . The expressions (28) and (29) are encouraging for the following reasons: While key ring sizes can in principle fluctuate over a large interval (given by (25)), potentially being as large as n + K − 1, both the expected size of a sensor's key ring and the average key ring size over the network are only 2K. Given that K ≥ 2 is already sufficient for connectivity and unassailability (viz. Theorems 1 and 2), and that any unbounded scaling K : N 0 → N 0 is enough to ensure unsplittability (viz. Theorem 3), we see that 2K n might possibly be orders of magnitude smaller than n + K n − 1 in the parameter regime of interest. This argument can indeed be taken one step further under some conditions on the scaling K : N 0 → N 0 : From (27) we readily check that
as soon as the scaling K : N 0 → N 0 satisfies (14). 
C. How Big Can the Biggest Key Rings Be?
From (30) it follows that each key ring size has a propensity to hover about its mean 2K n for large n under the condition (14) . However, the deterministic constraint (29) implies that the sizes of the key rings are negatively correlated. In fact it is a simple matter to show with the help of (26) that
for any scaling K : N 0 → N 0 . In other words, the convergence result (30) does not rule out the possibility of a few sensors having exceptionally large key ring sizes when the network is of large size. Were this to occur, the pairwise scheme would be rendered impractical under the limited memory resources available to each sensor. Of course this discussion assumes that the sensors are all identical in their (limited) capabilities, a likely occurrence with networks consisting of many cheap sensors. In such applications it may be unfeasible to have even a few sensors store and manage a very large number of cryptographic keys.
To explore such worst case scenarios, we need to better understand the asymptotic behavior of the maximal key ring size given by 
Theorem 4: Consider any scaling
It follows from (31) that 
In other words,
We refer the reader to [28] for numerical results supporting Theorems 4 and 5 in the finite n case. We now turn to the question of how big the key ring sizes are likely to be under the conditions needed for unassailability and unsplittability. In our discussion we rely on the following monotonicity facts which also find use in the proof of Theorem 4 in Section XIII, namely the stochastic comparisons
where ≤ st denotes comparison in the strong stochastic order [16, Ch. 8] . See Section XIII for proofs. We start with unassailability: The largest key ring is stochastically smallest when K = 2 by virtue of (34), in which case unassailability holds by Theorem 2 and the random graph H(n; K) is a.a.s. connected by Theorem 1. Under such conditions it holds that |Σ| n,Max (2) = O log n log log n a.a.s.
by Theorem 5. Next, we turn to unsplittability. This time, we pick a scaling K : N 0 → N 0 which satisfies the unsplittability condition (14) , namely lim n→∞ K n = ∞. In view of Theorem 1, such a scaling also ensures that H(n; K n ) is a.a.s. connected (and in fact also unassailable by virtue of Theorem 2). It is clear that the scaling can be selected to satisfy both (14) and K n = O(log n) -Just take K n = a log n for some a > 0, in which case
by Theorem 4. Thus, the pairwise scheme can ensure unsplittability (together with unassailability and connectivity) with a maximum key ring size being a.a.s. on the order log n, a size deemed feasible for large WSNs [4] .
VIII. COMPARISON WITH THE EG SCHEME
We now compare the resiliency of sensor networks against node capture attacks under the pairwise scheme with that of the EG scheme. More precisely, we consider the two schemes in terms of the number of cryptographic keys they require (at a minimum) to ensure (i) connectivity and unassailability; and (ii) connectivity and unsplittability. Network connectivity is enforced along with the resiliency metrics since it is a desirable property that is expected to hold in many practical situations.
The resiliency of WSNs to node capture attacks under the EG scheme was investigated by Mei et al. [12] . They obtained conditions on the scheme parameters to guarantee the appropriate analogs of (8) and (13) . Their findings are summarized next.
Let K(n; θ) denote the random key graph on the vertex set {1, . . . , n} induced by the EG scheme under full visibility [20] , [27] ; here θ = (Σ EG , P ) collectively stands for the parameters that specify the EG scheme, namely the (fixed) size Σ EG of the key ring of each sensor node and the size P of the key pool. Let Σ n,1 (θ), . . . , Σ n,n (θ) denote the key rings associated with nodes 1, . . . , n, respectively, in the EG scheme. By construction, the rvs Σ n,1 (θ), . . . , Σ n,n (θ) are i.i.d. rvs, each of which is uniformly distributed over the collection of all subsets of size Σ EG from a key pool of size P . Thus, by construction we have |Σ n,1 (θ)| = · · · = |Σ n,n (θ)| = Σ EG . A scaling for the EG scheme is any pair of mappings Σ EG , P : N 0 → N 0 such that
We can now present the main result obtained in [12] .
Theorem 6: Consider a scaling Σ EG , P : N 0 → N 0 for the EG scheme such that P n = n α for some α > 0 and such that
for some ε > 0 for all n sufficiently large. If α ≥ 2, then the conditions (8) and (13) both hold and the random graph K(n; θ) is a.a.s. connected.
In [12] it is claimed, but without proofs, that both properties also hold under the weaker conditions Σ EG,n ≥ log n and P n = n log n . Comparing the two schemes leads to several interesting conclusions. First, it is clear from the discussion in Section VII-C that the pairwise scheme can ensure unassailability and network connectivity with the size of all key rings being on the order log n log log n . On the other hand, it follows from Theorem 6 that the same properties would seem to require key rings on the order of √ n log n in the EG scheme (since we need α ≥ 2 in (35)). Similarly, under the pairwise scheme, we see that unsplittability and connectivity can be ensured with all sensors keeping O(log n) keys, whereas the EG scheme would again require key rings with size √ n log n. These conclusions are summarized in Figure 4 . For the sake of completeness, we have also included the average key ring sizes (see (29)) required in the pairwise scheme to ensure unassailability and unsplittability. Thus, the pairwise scheme Fig. 4 . A comparison of the EG scheme and the pairwise scheme in terms of the minimum number of keys required to achieve unassailability and unsplittability. Here, wn stands for any sequence satisfying limn→∞ wn = ∞. The pairwise scheme can ensure both properties with much less memory load on the sensors as compared to the EG scheme.
can ensure both properties with much smaller key ring sizes than would be needed for the EG scheme.
IX. SOME BASIC BOUNDS Consider positive integers n and K such that n < K. Pick a non-empty subset A ⊆ N n of nodes with 0 < |A| < n. The expression (18) for C A (n; K) being rather cumbersome to use, we will rely instead on the bound
where we have set
The validity of (36) can be argued as follows: There are at most K|A| compromised edges which originate from the nodes in A, i.e., at most K|A| edges are created in H(n; K) as a result of the selections {Γ n,i (K) : i ∈ A}. On the other hand, there are exactly L A (n; K) compromised edges originating out of the nodes in A c . For future reference we note that
Next, we derive Hoeffding bounds for the rvs L A (n; K). Consider the mapping Φ :
with the understanding that t log t = 0 if t = 0 (by continuity). It is easy to check that Φ(x) > 0 if x > −1. Proposition 7: Consider positive integers n and K such that n < K. For any non-empty subset A ⊆ N n of nodes with 0 < |A| < n, it holds that
for all t > 0. We also have the bilateral bound
for every ε > 0.
A proof of Proposition 7 is given in Appendix B (see the Supplementary File).
X. AN EASY CONSEQUENCE
In the proofs we will have several opportunities to use the following easy consequence of the bound (40).
Proposition 8: Consider positive integers n and K such that n < K. With r = 1, . . . , n − 1, let λ > 0 satisfy the condition
Then, the bound
holds with
Proof: Fix r = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1. With λ > 0 we have
where (45) follows by a union bound argument, while the step before last made use of the bound (36). We write L r (n; K) for L A (n; K) when A = {1, . . . , r}. Taking note of the fact that the rvs L A (n; K) : A ∈ P n|r are equidistributed, we conclude that
upon recalling the standard facts
As we have in mind to use (40) we inquire whether we can indeed find t > 0 such that
a requirement equivalent to
Solving for t we find
Under the condition (42), the bound (40) can be used with this value of t (because t > 0), yielding
Direct inspection shows that
by virtue of (48). It is now straightforward to check that
Combining these facts we conclude that
with F λ (n; r) given by (44), and the bound
holds as a rewrite of (50). The desired conclusion (43) is now a simple consequence of (47) and of this last bound.
XI. A PROOF OF THEOREM 2
The proof proceeds in two steps: First we provide an upper bound on the probability of interest using the auxiliary result presented in Proposition 8. Then we let n go to infinity.
A. From Keys to Edges
Consider the random graph H(n; K) for positive integers n and K such that K < n. By construction each key determines one and only one (undirected) edge in H(n; K), whereas at most two keys can be associated with any given (undirected) edge. For any edge i ∼ j, this last scenario occurs when both events i ∈ Γ n,i (K) and j ∈ Γ n,i (K) take place. As a result, we obtain the following bounds
Fix r = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1. With ε > 0 the lower bound in (55) yields
If ε > 0 satisfies the condition
then (42) holds for λ = ε 2 , and Proposition 8 yields the bound
where F ε 2 (n; r) is given by (44) (with λ = ε 2 ).
B. Taking the Limit With n Going to Infinity
Consider scalings K : N 0 → N 0 and r : N 0 → N 0 such that
Set
Under (58), we have t n > 0 for all n sufficiently large, say n ≥ n for some positive integer n . On that range, it follows from (57) (with K = K n and r = r n ) that
Let n go to infinity in the inequality (59): Under (58) we observe that 
The desired conclusion (8) is now immediate.
XII. A PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Here as well, the proof proceeds in two distinct steps, namely an upper bound followed by a limiting argument.
A. Splittability and Compromised Edges
As we now turn to establishing (13), fix n and K such that K < n. The discussion starts with the following observation: Consider an attack that succeeds in capturing the nodes in A, and let S denote an arbitrary subset of nodes in N n . If S is A-splittable, then all the edges between the set of nodes S and its complement S c (in N n ) are compromised by the capture of nodes in A. Hence, the total number C A (n; K) of edges which are therefore compromised by this attack must be at least |E(n; K)(S)|. Therefore, by the characterization (9) of S being A-splittable we have the inclusion
From the definitions it is plain that (13) holds trivially when For each r = 1, . . . , n − 1, the definition of the count variable I r (n; K) and the last inclusion together imply
by a union bound argument in the last step. Next, pick ε > 0 and δ in (0, 1) such that
The need for doing so will become apparent below. For each S in N n,γ , conditioning on the size of E(n; K)(S) relative to εnK, we readily see that
Using this fact with (61) we conclude that
Now if condition (42) is satisfied with λ = ε, say
then the auxiliary bound (43) yields
with F ε (n; r) given by (44) (with λ = ε). It then follows that
upon using the rough bound |N n,γ | ≤ 2 n . As we consider the summation term in the right handside of (64), pick S in N n,γ and observe that
Note that
since γn ≤ |S| ≤ n 2 by membership of S in N n,γ . From (62) and (68) we automatically have
for all n = 1, 2, . . .. The bound (67) therefore implies
where the last inequality is a consequence of the bilateral bound (41) given in Proposition 7. Exploiting (68) one more time, we finally get
It follows that
S∈Nn,γ
Combining the bounds (66) and (70), we get from (64) that
provided both conditions (62) and (65) hold; here F ε (n; r) is given by (44) and Φ(δ) > 0 is defined at (39).
B. Taking the Limit With n Going to Infinity
We make use of the bound (71) as follows: Consider scalings K : N 0 → N 0 and r : N 0 → N 0 such that (58) holds. Pick ε > 0 and δ in (0, 1) such that (62) is satisfied. Note that under (58), the condition (65) (with r = r n ) will eventually hold for all n sufficiently large, say n ≥ n for some positive integer n . On that range, the bound (71) therefore holds with K = K n and r = r n , yielding 
Let n go to infinity in (72): As in the proof of Theorem 2, under (58) the limit (60) holds, hence lim n→∞ r n n log 1 e r n n − log 2 + F ε (n; r n )K n = ∞ regardless of the behavior of the scaling K : N 0 → N 0 , while the condition (14) ensures
The desired conclusion (13) is now immediate.
XIII. A PROOF OF THEOREM 4 A. A Monotonicity Result
We begin by first establishing the monotonicity results (33) and (34). Fix positive integers K and n such that K < n. Note from (26) that
with X n,i (K) defined by
For each i = 1, . . . , n, the rvs X n,i (K) and X n,i (K + 1) are Binomial rvs Bin(n − 1,
holds by well-known facts and properties concerning the stochastic ordering ≤ st (e.g., see [16, Ch. 8] ). Therefore, we get
and the conclusion
follows. Unfortunately, as discussed in Appendix A (see the Supplementary File), the rvs |Σ n,1 (K)|, . . . |Σ n,n (K)| are not independent; they are in fact negatively correlated; see Section VII-C. As a result, the one-dimensional comparisons (75) do not necessarily imply the desired result (34). A stronger version of (75) (in the usual pointwise sense) needs to be established through a coupling argument we now develop: With K and n such that K + 1 < n, consider the i.i.d. random sets Γ n,1 (K + 1), . . . , Γ n,n (K + 1). For each i = 1, . . . , n, let U n,i (K) denote a rv Ω → N n,−i which is uniformly distributed over the set Γ n,i (K + 1) conditionally on Γ n,1 (K + 1), . . . , Γ n,n (K + 1) with P [U n,i (K) = | Γ n,1 (K + 1), . . . , Γ n,n (K + 1)]
Possibly by enlarging the probability triple (Ω, F , P), this construction can be carried out so that the rvs U n,1 (K + 1)), . . . , U n,n (K + 1) are mutually independent given (Γ n,1 (K +1), . . . , Γ n,n (K +1)), and the pointwise constraints 
are simultaneously satisfied. 2 Fix i = 1, . . . , n. In view of (77), we can now define the random set Γ n,i (K) as the set obtained by removing U n,i (K + 1) from Γ n,i (K + 1), i.e., 
with | Γ n,i (K)| = K. Under the enforced conditional independence given (Γ n,1 (K+1), . . . , Γ n,n (K+1)), it is easy to check that the rvs Γ n,1 (K), . . . , Γ n,n (K) are mutually independent. Furthermore, we now show that for each i = 1, . . . , n, the distributional equality Γ n,i (K) = st Γ n,i (K) holds. Indeed, by construction the set Γ n,i (K) is a subset of N n which does not contain i and which has exactly K elements in it. Thus, for any subset S ⊆ N n,−i with |S| = K, we have P By construction (and earlier remarks), the random vector Γ n,1 (K), . . . , Γ n,n (K) has the same distribution as the random vector (Γ n,1 (K), . . . , Γ n,n (K)). It is now plain from (73) that the random vector K + X n,1 (K), . . . , K + X n,n (K) has the same distribution as the random vector (|Σ n,1 (K)|, . . . , |Σ n,n (K)|), so that
However, the inclusions (78) also imply follows. We readily conclude (34) with the help of (80).
B. Proving Theorem 4
It is known [28, Th. 4.2] (and the discussion following it) that if a scaling K : N 0 → N 0 satisfies K n ∼ λ log n for some λ ≥ 2.6, then
for any c ≥ 1.
Now, pick an arbitrary scaling K : N 0 → N 0 such that K n = O(log n). This amounts to the existence of a constant a > 0 such that K n ≤ a log n for all n sufficiently large, say n ≥ n a for some finite integer n a . Define the auxiliary scalingK a : N 0 → N 0 by settingK a,n = a log n for all n = 1, 2, . . .. Note that K n ≤K a,n for all n ≥ n a with K a,n ∼ a log n.
Two cases are possible: If a ≥ 2.6, then putting c = 1 in (81) yields lim n→∞ P |Σ| n,Max (K a,n ) > 3K a,n = 0, whence lim n→∞ P |Σ| n,Max (K a,n ) > (3a + 1) log n = 0, (82) sinceK a,n ≤ a log n + 1 ≤ (a + 1 3 ) log n for all n sufficiently large. Using the stochastic comparison (34) with K n andK a,n we conclude
whenever n ≥ n a . Letting n go to infinity in this last inequality and using (82), we obtain the desired result (31) with γ = 3a + 1. If a < 2.6, then the same arguments as above show that K n ≤K a,n ≤K 2.6,n for all n ≥ n a . Applying (82) and (83) with a = 2.6 yields the desired result (31) with γ = 8.8.
XIV. FUTURE WORK
The research presented in this paper can be extended in several directions. Firstly, the analysis of the resiliency properties of sensor networks has only been done under the full visibility assumption. Future research should address situations where wireless communication connectivity is explicitly taken into account. Secondly, it might be worthwhile extending the analysis to key predistribution schemes other than the EG scheme and the pairwise scheme. A good candidate would be the q-composite scheme introduced in [3] , which is a direct extension of the EG scheme. Finally, one might revisit the analysis with a less powerful attacker model and examine how the required key ring sizes are affected by the capabilities of the potential adversary.
